



TikTok's DSA Transparency Report

January - June 2025





Introduction

At TikTok, our mission is to inspire creativity and bring joy. The safety and well-being of our community is our priority, TikTok has a strong track record in proactive transparency reporting; we have been publishing [transparency reports](#) since 2019. We also report on our efforts to combat disinformation on our platform under the [Code of Conduct on Disinformation](#) on a six monthly basis. Building on our transparency efforts and in line with our obligations under the Digital Services Act (DSA), we are pleased to publish our fifth DSA transparency report, for the reporting period of 1 January 2025 to 30 June 2025.

TikTok Shop launched in Ireland and Spain in December 2024, followed by Germany, France, and Italy on 31 March 2025. This report includes H1 2025 data for Ireland and Spain, and partial-period data for Germany, France, and Italy.

We have a number of measures designed to keep users safe across priority areas, including from illegal and other harmful content. We are pleased to report on the numbers underlying these measures including the additional reporting option we have implemented to allow people to report content in the European Union they believe is illegal. Key insights from this report include:

- **Strong accuracy against violative content:** During this reporting period, we removed around **27.8 million pieces of content** that violated our Community Guidelines. Our moderation systems maintained a **high accuracy rate of 99.2%** (compared with 99.12% in H2 2024), showing continued improvements in both precision and consistency.
- **Working faster with Trusted Flaggers:** The number of reports from Trusted Flaggers increased to 82, and as the number of reports increased, we were also able to respond more efficiently, reducing the median time of response by 20 hours.
- **Increase in orders from government authorities:** We cut our median response time in half, from six hours to three, even as we received a significant increase in orders from government authorities. This included a particularly high number of requests from the Romanian government, during the election period.

Providing transparency to our community about how we keep them safe is an ongoing commitment that has no finish line. We are pleased to have built on the efforts of our previous DSA transparency reports, for example by providing greater granularity on metrics relating to accuracy, error rates, and appeals, in this fifth edition. With the adoption of the Implementing Regulation laying down templates concerning the transparency reporting obligations of providers of online platforms, future DSA transparency reports will follow the harmonized template format, with the first such report due in early 2026.



Report index

1. **Content moderation** (+ Annexes A and B)

2. **Illegal content reports** (+ Annex C)

3. **TikTok's content moderators** (+ Annex D)

4. **Orders from government authorities** (+ Annexes E and F)

5. **Complaints and disputes** (+ Annex G)

6. **Suspensions**

7. **Monthly active recipients** (+ Annex H)



Section 1. Content moderation

TikTok strives to foster an open and inclusive environment where people can create, find community, and be entertained. To maintain that environment, we take action upon content and accounts that violate our applicable terms and policies, including our [Terms of Service](#), [Community Guidelines](#), [Advertising Policies](#) and TikTok Shop Policies (together, our **Policies**). We are committed to being transparent with our community about the moderation actions we take. The number and type of restrictions we impose as part of our content moderation activities are available at **Annex A**.

Our Policies are the starting point when it comes to how we form and operate our content moderation strategies and practices and they contain provisions which prohibit various forms of illegal and other harmful content. We use a combination of automation and human moderation to identify, review, and action content that violates our Policies.

Key principles

We operate our content moderation processes using automation and human moderation in accordance with the following four pillars, which provide that we will:

1. Remove violative content from the platform that violates our Policies, or restrict content which is illegal (noting that we do not allow several types of mature content themes, including gory, gruesome, disturbing, or extremely violent content);
2. Age-restrict mature content (that does not violate our Community Guidelines but which contains mature themes) so it is only viewed by adults (18 years and older);
3. Maintain For You feed eligibility standards to help ensure any content that may be promoted by the recommendation system is appropriate for a broad audience; and
4. Empower our community with information, tools, and resources.

Automated Review

We place considerable emphasis on proactive detection to remove violative content and reduce exposure to potentially distressing content for our human moderators. Before content is posted to our platform, it's reviewed by automated moderation technologies which identify content or behavior that may violate our policies or For You feed eligibility standards, or that may require age-restriction or other actions. While undergoing this review, the content is visible only to the uploader.

If our automated moderation technology identifies content that is a potential violation, it will either take action against the content or flag it for further review by our human moderation teams. In line with our safeguards to help ensure accurate decisions are made, automated removal is applied when violations are the most clear-cut.

Some of the methods and technologies that support these efforts include:

- **Vision-based:** Computer vision models can identify objects that violate our Community Guidelines—like weapons or hate symbols.
- **Audio-based:** Audio clips are reviewed for violations of our Community Guidelines, supported by a dedicated audio bank and "classifiers" that help us detect audios that are similar or modified to previous violations.
- **Text-based:** Detection models review written content like comments or hashtags, using foundational keyword lists to find variations of violative text. "Natural language processing"—a type of Artificial Intelligence (AI) that can interpret the context surrounding content—helps us identify violations that are context-dependent, such as words that can be used in a hateful way but may not violate our policies by themselves. We also work with various external experts, like our [fact-checking partners](#), to inform our keyword lists.
- **Similarity-based:** "Similarity detection systems" enable us to not only catch identical or highly similar versions of violative content, but other types of content that share key contextual similarities and may require additional review.

- **Activity-based:** Technologies that look at how accounts are being operated help us disrupt deceptive activities like bot accounts, spam, or attempts to artificially inflate engagement through fake likes or follow attempts.
- **LLM-based:** We're starting to use a kind of AI called "large language learning models" to scale and improve content moderation. LLMs can comprehend human language and perform highly specific, complex tasks. This can make it possible to moderate content with a higher degree of precision, consistency and speed than human moderation.
- **Multi-modal LLM-based:** "Multi-modal LLMs" can also perform complex, highly specific tasks related to other types of content, such as visual content. For example, we can use this technology to make misinformation moderation easier by extracting specific misinformation "claims" from videos that moderators can isolate and assess more quickly.
- We work with external groups, for example [Tech Against Terrorism](#) in the context of [violent extremist](#) content, who help us to more quickly detect and remove violative content that has already been identified off the platform.

Ongoing advancements in AI and other moderation technologies can also benefit the overall well-being of content moderators by requiring them to review less content. It also provides moderators with better tools to do this critical moderation work. For instance, over the course of 2024, the number of videos that moderators removed for Shocking and Graphic policy violations decreased by 60% as our moderation technologies took on more of these potentially distressing videos. Meanwhile, technologies like AI help make it easier to moderate nuanced areas like misinformation by extracting specific misinformation "claims" from videos for moderators to assess directly or route to our fact-checking partners.

We continue to invest in a range of safety technologies to strengthen moderation accuracy, support our safety team and their well-being, while improving the scale and speed of our trust and safety efforts. If users or advertisers believe we have made a mistake, they can [appeal](#) the removal of their content.

In assessing the effectiveness of our automated moderation technologies, the H1 2025 DSA transparency report captures a broader range of automated enforcement actions, including automated LIVE enforcement, when compared with our previous reports. We consider that the appropriate indicator of accuracy is the proportion of content where the original enforcement decision was upheld or maintained. We consider that the appropriate indicator of error is the proportion of content where the original enforcement decision was overturned. For H1 2025, the accuracy rate for our automated moderation technologies for content was 99.2% and the error rate was 0.8% (see **Annex B** for more information).

Human expertise

Human insight plays a crucial role in the content moderation process, from our community or external experts, to our own safety professionals. We build channels for gathering feedback about content on TikTok so we can identify new or evolving trends and use technology to scale the impact of human assessments. Some of the ways we do this include:

- **Reviewing content flagged by technology.** When our automated moderation systems identify potentially problematic content but cannot make an automated decision to take action against it, they send the content to our moderation teams for further review. To support this work, we have developed technology that can identify potentially violative items – for example, emblems associated with extremist groups – in video frames, so that content moderators can carefully review the video and the context in which it appears. This technology improves the efficiency of moderators by helping them more adeptly identify violative images or objects, quickly recognise violations, and make decisions accordingly.
- **Teams of safety experts oversee and regularly update the detection rules that tell our technologies what to look for.** This includes conducting proactive investigations into new kinds of harmful content, adding new keywords or rules when needed, and updating existing ones to ensure our approach is still proportional. The teams who work on these include experts in certain safety topics (such as hate speech or misinformation), as well as experts in local markets who can account for local nuances.

- **Content that is gaining a lot of views may be routed for additional review by content moderators.** This helps us reduce the reach of violative content and ensure that content which is recommended to the For You feed is appropriate for a broad, general audience.
- **Our community uses in-app and online reporting tools to flag any content or account they feel is in violation of our Community Guidelines.** Community reports are an important component of our content moderation process, however, the vast majority of removed content is identified proactively before it is reported to us (see **Annex A** for more information). We use technology to quickly address clear-cut violations, while human experts focus on addressing new or complex kinds of violations.
- **Our global Community Partner Channel gives organizations with safety expertise an additional route for reporting content that they believe violates our Community Guidelines.** Hundreds of organizations who specialize in a range of safety issues use our Community Partner Channel. Their reports help inform safety professionals who can take any additional actions necessary to prevent similar content from spreading. They also give us early insight into harmful content that is spreading off TikTok, so we can take any necessary preventative measures before it reaches our platform.
- **Assessing appeals.** If someone disagrees with our decision to restrict or remove their content or an account, they can [appeal](#) the decision for reconsideration. These appeals may be sent to moderators to decide if the content should be reinstated on the platform or the account reinstated.

Section 2. Illegal content reports

Our Policies apply to all accounts and content on the platform, and they often align with, and sometimes go beyond, local law requirements. While we primarily enforce our Policies at our own initiative through automated and human moderation, users can also use the reporting functions to alert TikTok to content they believe violates our Policies. The number of reports made in the European Union to TikTok during the period 1 January 2025 to 30 June 2025 is at **Annex C**. Under DSA, trusted flaggers can also submit illegal content reports.

As part of our requirements under the DSA, we have introduced an [additional reporting channel](#) for our community in the European Union to 'Report Illegal Content', which enables users to alert us to content they believe breaches the law. When users report suspected illegal content, they will be asked to select a category of illegal content they are reporting under. Reporters are also asked to provide additional information, such as: the jurisdiction in question; if possible, the specific law in question; and a clear explanation as to why they think the content violates the law. If the report is incomplete (for example, it does not provide enough information for us to assess if the content is illegal) or materially unsubstantiated, the report may be rejected. The reporter will be notified of this decision and provided with an opportunity to re-submit their report with more information. This helps us properly and effectively consider and respond to each report.

Illegal content reports are processed through a combination of automation and human review. We will review the content against our Policies and where a violation is detected, the content may be removed globally. If it is not removed, our illegal content moderation team will further review the content to assess whether it is unlawful in the relevant jurisdiction - this assessment is undertaken by human review. In making our determination, we are required to balance any competing legal rights, such as freedom of speech. Content found to be illegal will generally be restricted in the country where it is illegal or, in some cases, across the EEA region or by removing the content from the platform entirely. Those who report suspected illegal content will be notified of our decision, including if we consider that the content is not illegal. Users who disagree can [appeal](#) those decisions using the appeals process.

Section 3. TikTok's moderators

Our mission to inspire creativity and bring joy to people around the world is made possible by the critical work of our content moderators who review and remove illegal and other harmful content and behaviour from the platform. TikTok has 4,596 people dedicated to the moderation of content in the European Union as of the end of June 2025 (see **Annex D** for more information).



Our Trust & Safety teams lead our approach to content moderation. They are responsible for the development of our Community Guidelines and related moderation policies, and for the moderation of content on TikTok. For the European Union, TikTok's Trust & Safety work is led from Dublin, Ireland, where a number of key global Trust & Safety personnel are based. For ads and branded content, our Monetisation Integrity and Business Integrity teams are responsible for TikTok's Advertising Policies and related moderation policies, and play a key role in their moderation. Our TikTok Shop Governance & Experience teams develop TikTok Shop policies, and are involved in the moderation of TikTok Shop listings and other TikTok Shop-related content.

Training

To ensure a consistent understanding and application of our Policies, all content moderator personnel receive training across our relevant Policies. All content moderators undergo training on TikTok's content moderation systems and moderator wellness issues. Personnel involved in reviewing reported illegal content receive additional focused training on assessing the legality of reported illegal content.

Content moderation training materials are kept under review to ensure that they are accurate and current. Such materials include clearly defined learning objectives to ensure our content moderators understand the core policy issues and their underlying policy rationale, key terms and policy exceptions (where applicable).

Members of our moderation teams attend regular internal sessions dedicated to knowledge sharing and discussion about relevant issues and trends, which include input from external experts. For example, as part of our Election Speaker Series, which helps inform our approach to elections, we invite suitably qualified external local and regional experts to share their insights and market expertise with our internal teams. During the reporting period, we ran 7 Election Speaker Series sessions, 4 in EU Member States, Germany, Poland, Romania and Portugal, and 4 in Albania, Belarus, Greenland, and Kosovo.

Our teams also participate in various external events to share expertise and support their continued professional learning. These engagements contribute to the team's awareness of the risks which may arise on the platform, which in turn informs our approach to content moderation. At the end of June 2025, we sent a 14 strong delegation to GlobalFact12 in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. TikTok was a top-tier sponsor of GlobalFact. Sponsorship money supports IFCN's work serving the fact-checking community and makes the conference itself possible for fact-checking organizations to attend through providing travel scholarships. The annual conference represents the most important industry event for TikTok's Global Fact-Checking Program and covers a broad set of topics related to mis- and dis-information that are discussed in main stage sessions and break-out rooms. In addition, TikTok hosted a networking event with more than 80 people from our partner organizations, including staff from fact checking partners, media literacy organizations, and TikTok's Safety Advisory Councils.

Support

Human safety professionals continue to play a crucial role in our content moderation approach. We have thousands of safety professionals globally who help build our technologies, develop and enforce our policies, design new safety features, and work with experts and industry peers. We strive to promote a caring working environment for all TikTok employees, and for trust and safety professionals especially. We use an evidence-based approach to develop programs and resources that support their psychological well-being.

Our primary focus is on preventative care measures to minimize the risk of psychological injury through well-timed support, training and tools, from recruitment through to onboarding and ongoing employment, that help foster resilience while minimising the risk of psychological injury. These may include tools and features to allow employees to control exposure to graphic content when reviewing or moderating content, including grayscaling, muting and blurring; training for managers to help them identify when a team member may need additional well-being support; and clinical and therapeutic support. We also continue to lean into moderation technology as an effective way to reduce human moderators' exposure to harmful content.



We provide our trust and safety employees with membership to the Trust and Safety Professional Association (TSPA). This membership allows them to access resources for career development, participate in workshops and events, and connect with a network of peers across the industry.

Qualifications & linguistic expertise

Some of the issues which arise on the platform are highly localised in terms of language and region, which requires deep knowledge and awareness of relevant cultural nuances, terms and context.

To address this, and ensure its content moderators are appropriately qualified to make decisions, we have regional policy teams in each region, which includes coverage for all European Union Member States, for example with either designated policy country managers for larger countries or policy managers covering a number of smaller countries.

Based primarily in Dublin, the EMEA Regional Policy team brings regional insights, cultural context, and local expertise to ensure that global moderation policies are applied appropriately across diverse countries and communities in Europe. Acting as expert policy ambassadors, they work to create a safe and positive experience for users by ensuring that our Community Guidelines and policy principles are upheld in ways that reflect local realities. They play a key role in risk mitigation by detecting and addressing regional trends, engaging with external experts such as NGOs, civil society organisations, and government authorities, and collaborating closely with cross-functional teams. Their work includes developing policy interventions and enforcement strategies that strengthen our ability to reduce harm, while maintaining a safe and welcoming environment for our community.

The localised policy outputs from the EMEA regional policy team enable our content moderation teams to take a regionally informed approach to content moderation (e.g. rapidly evolving alternative vocabulary or terminology in relation to an unfolding election issue, which may vary/evolve over time and as between countries and languages).

We have also established a number of specialised moderation teams to assist our moderators to review content relating to complex issues. For example, assessing harmful misinformation requires additional context and assessment by our misinformation moderators who have enhanced training, expertise and tools to identify such content, including our global repository of previously fact-checked claims from the IFCN-accredited fact-checking partners and direct access to our fact-checking partners where appropriate.

We moderate content in more than 70 languages globally and we are transparent in our [regular Community Guidelines Enforcement Reports](#) about the primary languages our moderators work in globally. We have language capabilities covering at least one official language for each of the 27 European Union Member States, as well as a number of other languages that are commonly spoken in the region (for example, Arabic and Turkish). This language capability complements our awareness-raising materials, like the Community Guidelines, that are also available in multiple languages. We also have moderation personnel that are not assigned to a particular language, who assist with reviewing content such as photos and profiles.

Section 4. Orders from government authorities

We may receive requests from government authorities in the European Union to remove content. When we receive such requests from government authorities, we review and take action upon content in line with our Policies and the applicable law. During the period 1 January 2025 and 30 June 2025, we received 3976 requests from government authorities in the European Union to remove content (see **Annex E** for more information).

We may also receive requests from government authorities in the European Union for user information disclosure. We respond to these in a manner that respects the privacy and other rights of our users. Any request we receive is carefully reviewed on a case-by-case basis in line with our [Law Enforcement Guidelines](#). Our policies and procedures govern how we handle and respond to such requests and only disclose user data where a request is based on a valid legal process. During the period 1 January 2025 and 3 June 2025, we received 9470 information requests from government authorities in the European Union (see **Annex F** for more information).



Section 5. Complaints and disputes

Complaints

Anyone can report content on TikTok they believe violates our Policies or applicable laws and can appeal if they disagree with the outcome of our decision. Users are also provided with a notification where we determine that they have violated our Policies and applicable laws, and they are provided with an opportunity to appeal against any action we have taken. We provide information to users about how to appeal a decision in relation to a report they have made, or how to appeal a decision affecting their content or account [here](#). We report on the number of appeals, and the action we take in response to those appeals, in **Annex G**.

Disputes submitted to out-of-court dispute settlement bodies

The DSA provides users of the platform with the right to access a third party out-of-court dispute settlement process to resolve any disputes that they may have with us regarding moderation actions (including in relation to any appeals), essentially allowing users to submit appeals of content moderation decisions to an independent third party for assessment. We report on the number of appeals submitted to these bodies, the outcomes of the dispute settlement, the median time needed for completing the dispute settlement procedures, and the share of appeals where we implemented the decisions of the body, in **Annex G**.

Section 6. Suspensions

We may suspend or permanently ban accounts where we identify violations of our Policies, including where:

- the user does not meet the minimum age or other requirements as indicated in our Terms of Service;
- the account impersonates another person or entity in a deceptive manner;
- a user has a severe violation on their account (such as promoting or threatening violence);
- an account reaches the strike threshold for multiple violations within a policy or feature; or
- multiple violations of our Intellectual Property Policy.

We report on the number of accounts suspended during the period 1 January 2025 and 30 June 2025 for violations of our Policies in **Annex A**. TikTok has a system for suspending users that repeatedly violate our Community Guidelines. Within the relevant period, this system issued 536,898 bans based on the severity and frequency of the violations. Separate to the rejection of incomplete or materially unsubstantiated illegal content reports, TikTok did not suspend the processing of illegal content reports or complaints due to individuals frequently submitting manifestly unfounded notices or manifestly unfounded complaints.

Section 7. Average monthly recipients per Member State

We report on the average number of 'monthly active recipients', broken down per each of the 27 European Union Member States in **Annex H** during the period from January to June 2025.



Annex A - TikTok's own-initiative content moderation

This Annex A provides the number of moderation actions we took against content and accounts under our Policies. It consists of numbers of user-generated video and LIVE content removed and restricted, for example according to the application of our [Eligibility Standards](#) or [Content Levels](#), as well as restrictions imposed on access to features (i.e. service restriction), and the number of ads and items of TikTok Shop-related content removed.

Content-level moderation actions

This table sets out the number of the content-level moderation actions taken where content is found to violate our Policies, broken down by the type of policy that the content has been actioned under and by the moderation action taken.

		Type of moderation action taken		
		Content Removed	Content Restricted	Service Restricted
Type of policy actioned under	Community Guidelines	24,534,707	169,527,678	2,781,470
	Advertising Policies	2,470,592	N.A	N.A
	TikTok Shop Policies	829,861	N.A	3,239



This table shows the number of content items removed for violating our Policies, broken down by sub-policy under the Community Guidelines, Advertising Policies, and TikTok Shop Policies. It includes removals made using automated moderation technology, including newly added automated LIVE enforcements. As content may violate multiple policies, each violation is counted under every applicable sub-policy.

Type of policy	Detection method	
	Total content removed	Content removed automatically
Community Guidelines	24,534,707	17,729,896
Integrity & Authenticity	759,321	620,909
Mental & Behavioral Health	5,581,036	5,026,613
Privacy & Security	415,695	352,679
Regulated Goods & Commercial Activities	9,485,450	7,729,860
Safety & Civility	4,352,589	2,855,504
Sensitive & Mature Themes	8,552,437	6,305,376
Youth Safety & Well-Being	5,944,993	4,612,550
Advertising Policies	2,470,592	1,408,792
Ad Format	45,439	12,870
Adult & Sexual content	115,802	39,995
IP infringement	92,701	20,089
Misleading & False Content	828,647	536,433
Politics & Religion&Culture	143,693	105,435
Prohibited & Restricted Content	124,565	87,540
Prohibited & Restricted Industry	1,108,226	603,368



Type of policy	Detection method	
	Total content removed	Content removed automatically
Violence & Horror & Dangerous activity	11,519	3,062
TikTok Shop Policies	829,861	N.A
Consumer Protection	20,885	N.A
Youth Safety	809,037	N.A
Other Systemic Risks	9	N.A

Account-level moderation actions

This table shows the number of account-level restrictions (suspensions or bans) against users and advertisers for Policy violations, broken down by actions taken using automated moderation technology.

		Type of moderation action taken
		Account ban / suspension
Detection method	Total removed / suspended	4,906,735
	Accounts banned / suspended automatically	871,819



Annex B - Automated Review

This Annex B provides a breakdown of the indicators of accuracy and possible rate of error of our automated moderation technologies across the EU Member States. In our fifth DSA transparency report, we have captured a broader range of automated enforcement actions when compared to our previous report, and the table below now includes metrics relating to the removal, as well as the restriction, of user-generated videos, LIVE and ads content. We consider that the appropriate indicator of accuracy is the proportion of videos, LIVE and ads where the original enforcement decision was upheld or maintained. We consider that the appropriate indicator of error is the proportion of videos and ads content where the original enforcement decision was overturned.

Accuracy and Error Rate Across Member States		
Country Code	Error rate	Accuracy Rate
AT	1.6%	98.4%
BE	0.6%	99.4%
BG	0.3%	99.7%
CY	0.9%	99.1%
CZ	0.8%	99.2%
DE	1.4%	98.6%
DK	0.7%	99.3%
EE	0.5%	99.5%
ES	0.8%	99.2%
FI	1.0%	99.0%
FR	1.4%	98.6%
GR	0.8%	99.2%
HR	1.0%	99.0%

Accuracy and Error Rate Across Member States		
Country Code	Error rate	Accuracy Rate
HU	0.5%	99.5%
IE	0.5%	99.5%
IT	0.9%	99.1%
LT	0.6%	99.4%
LU	0.8%	99.2%
LV	0.8%	99.2%
MT	0.7%	99.3%
NL	0.8%	99.2%
PL	0.7%	99.3%
PT	0.5%	99.5%
RO	0.4%	99.6%
SE	0.6%	99.4%
SI	0.7%	99.3%
SK	0.3%	99.7%



Annex C - Illegal content reports

Illegal content reports by users

TikTok has an additional reporting channel for our European Union community to 'Report Illegal Content,' which enables users to alert us to content they believe breaches the law. This Annex C provides a breakdown of the illegal content reports we received from users within the European Union in relation to user-generated videos, LIVEs, ads and TikTok Shop-related content, broken down by the category of illegal content it has been reported under.

Where a median time has been provided for an action that has been taken, this has been calculated to take into account the respective number of actions and each feature's median time, in order to provide an accurate representation of the time taken across different features. This applies to median time calculations provided throughout this report.

We received a total number of 308,755 illegal content reports in the European Union, which corresponds to user reports on 151,354 unique items of content. Of the unique items of content reported, we took action against (i) 26,512 items of content on the basis that it violated local laws and (ii) 15,365 items of content on the basis that it breached our Policies. No action was taken on the remaining content reported, either because it was not found to be violative under our Policies or the relevant local laws or because the initial report did not contain enough information.

Median time needed for taking action pursuant to the illegal content reports: The median time between our receipt of an illegal content report and deciding whether or not to action that content under our Policies is under 17 hours, and under applicable law is less than 21 hours. The median time necessarily takes account of the time taken to review more complex user reports requiring a nuanced consideration of the legal requirements by a legal reviewer against the applicable local law. Assessing these reports can be a complex task as we strive to be consistent and equitable in our enforcement, while also weighing up our decisions against other important interests such as freedom of expression.

Category of reported illegal content	Number of user reports received
Child sexual exploitation	20,785
Consumer- related offences	15,558
Content relating to violent or organised crime	11,045
Defamation	16,577
Financial crime	17,979
Harassment or threats	18,765



Category of reported illegal content	Number of user reports received
Illegal goods / services	28,945
Illegal hate speech	23,938
Illegal privacy - related violations	39,638
Information - related offences / contempt of court	13,419
National security - related offences	7,101
Non-consensual sharing of private or intimate images	24,247
Other illegal content	56,230
Terrorist offences / content	14,470

Illegal content reports by Trusted Flaggers

As noted under Section 2 above, trusted flaggers can also submit illegal content reports under the DSA. In this regard, TikTok has introduced an additional reporting channel for our European Union community to 'Report Illegal Content,' which enables trusted flaggers to report content they consider to be illegal. This reporting channel was introduced at the end of H1 2024.

To date, we received a total number of 82 illegal content reports from trusted flaggers in the European Union relating to 74 unique items of content. Of the unique items of reported content, we took action against (i) 20 items of content for violating local laws and (ii) 14 items of content for breaching our Policies. Where no action was taken on reported content, it was because we found no violations under our Policies or relevant local laws, or because the report did not contain enough information.

Median time needed for taking action pursuant to the illegal content reports: The median time between our receipt of an illegal content report from a trusted flagger and deciding whether or not to action that content under applicable law is less than 11 hours and 32 hours under our Policies .



Category of reported illegal content	Number of trusted flaggers reports received
Child sexual exploitation	4
Consumer- related offences	0
Content relating to violent or organised crime	3
Defamation	21
Financial crime	0
Harassment or threats	1
Illegal goods / services	0
Illegal hate speech	28
Illegal privacy - related violations	3
Information - related offences / contempt of court	0
National security - related offences	0
Non-consensual sharing of private or intimate images	0
Other illegal content	2
Terrorist offences / content	20

Annex D - TikTok’s content moderators

Annex D sets out the number of people dedicated to content moderation under our Policies and applicable local laws, broken down by official EU language. Where moderators have expertise in multiple languages, that expertise is reflected in the breakdown. For example, Czech, Slovakian, and Slovenian are grouped together and moderated by the same team, while Croatian moderators also cover Serbian. The figures also include moderators for other commonly spoken regional languages such as Arabic, Catalan, Hindi, Pashto, Persian, Turkish, Ukrainian, Norwegian, Russian, and Icelandic.

These numbers cover only language moderators and do not include broader teams that also help keep our community safe, such as those developing moderation policies.

During the reporting period, we had 4,596 moderators dedicated to content moderation in the EU, including 247 non-language-specific moderators (e.g., those reviewing profiles or photos), who are not reflected in the language breakdown below.

People dedicated to content moderation	
Official Member State language	Number of people dedicated to content moderation
Bulgarian	34
Croatian	10
Czech	31
Danish	19
Dutch	100
English	1349
Estonian	10
Finnish	28
French	588
German	630



People dedicated to content moderation	
Official Member State language	Number of people dedicated to content moderation
Greek	29
Hungarian	37
Irish	0
Italian	377
Latvian	11
Lithuanian	5
Maltese	0
Polish	144
Portuguese	143
Romanian	103
Slovak	25
Slovenian	26
Spanish	468
Swedish	63



Annex E - Orders from government authorities to remove content

TikTok has a dedicated channel through which government authorities may submit orders to request to remove content. This Annex E provides the numbers of requests received through our dedicated channel from government authorities in the European Union to remove content, broken down by category of illegal content reported.

Between 1 January and 30 June 2025, we received 3976 content removal orders from EU government authorities—a higher number than previous periods, driven by increased requests during the EU elections.

Median time needed to inform government authority of receipt of order: We acknowledge receipt of an order from a government authority submitted through our dedicated channel immediately, by sending an automatic acknowledgement.

Median time needed to give effect to the order: The median time between our receipt of a valid order from a government authority submitted through our dedicated channel and us investigating and actioning, either by removing the content or otherwise providing a substantive response to the issuing government authority, is under 3 hours.



Orders from government authorities in the European Union to remove content

Categories of illegal content by Member State

Categories of illegal content	AT	BE	BG	CY	CZ	DE	DK	EE	ES	FI	FR	GR	HR	HU	IE	IT	LT	LU	LV	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SE	SI	SK
Child Sexual Exploitation	0	0	0	0	0	13	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Consumer-related Offences	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Content Relating to Violent or Organised Crime	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	9	0	0	0
Defamation	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Financial Crime	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	2	2	0	0
Harassment or Threats	2	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	1	0	11	0	1	2	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	0
Illegal Goods / Services	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Illegal Hate Speech	0	5	0	0	0	10	0	0	14	0	14	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	10	0	0	0
Illegal Privacy-Related Violations	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Information-Related Offences / Contempt of Court	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	22	0	21	0	0	1
National Security-Related Offences	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Non-Consensual Sharing of Private or Intimate Images	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other Illegal or Harmful Content	1	0	0	0	0	106	0	1	6	0	80	0	0	7	10	6	2	0	0	0	3	34	1	3384	14	0	0
Terrorist Offences / Content	0	10	0	0	0	77	2	0	4	0	32	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0



Annex F - Orders from government authorities to provide information

TikTok has a dedicated channel through which government authorities may submit orders to request disclosure of information. This Annex F provides the number of requests we received through our dedicated channel from government authorities in the European Union for user information disclosure, broken down by category of illegal content reported.

Between 1 January 2025 and 30 June 2025, we received 9470 orders from government authorities in the European Union for user information disclosure.

Median time needed to inform government authority of receipt of order: We acknowledge receipt of order from a government authority submitted through our dedicated channel immediately, by sending an automatic acknowledgement.

Median time needed to give effect to the order: The median time between our receipt of a valid order from a government authority submitted through our dedicated channel and us either providing the requested information, or otherwise providing a substantive response to the government authority issuing the order, is around 7 days. This median time includes both time taken to review more complex orders, which can include varying amounts of content, accounts or other identifiers that require processing, and situations where TikTok responds to the requesting government authority to seek clarification or further context in respect of the order, but where the requesting government authority provides no response. Such cases are closed after 28 days.



Orders from government authorities in the European Union to provide information																												
Category of illegal content by Member State																												
Categories of illegal content	AT	BE	BG	CY	CZ	DE	DK	EE	ES	FI	FR	GR	HR	HU	IE	IT	LT	LU	LV	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SE	SI	SK	
Child Exploitation	9	33	7	0	0	241	8	0	64	29	31	2	1	0	8	35	0	0	0	2	3	5	3	6	41	0	0	
Criminal Defamation	0	7	0	0	0	134	0	1	39	17	25	15	0	4	1	50	2	0	2	0	1	11	1	3	13	1	0	
Domestic Violence	0	0	0	0	0	17	0	0	63	0	4	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	0	0	
Drug Trafficking	4	2	0	0	0	84	0	0	2	1	14	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	1	2	0	0	
Environmental Crimes Animal Welfare	0	0	1	0	0	5	0	0	1	2	2	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	
Extortion Blackmail	12	18	0	0	3	120	2	0	21	1	65	5	1	0	1	13	0	0	0	5	5	1	3	4	14	1	0	
Faked Hacked Account	2	5	0	0	0	215	0	0	52	12	56	12	1	1	0	31	0	0	0	0	1	7	2	1	21	0	0	
Financial Fraud	36	12	2	0	4	208	0	0	114	4	45	12	0	5	1	3	0	0	2	3	0	8	6	13	11	0	0	
Firearms Weapons Possession Explosives	0	3	0	0	0	34	0	0	9	1	3	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	1	3	0	0	
Fugitive	1	1	0	0	0	82	0	0	1	0	5	1	0	6	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	18	0	0	0	
Harassment Bullying	9	58	0	1	0	252	11	2	49	8	94	3	5	3	4	25	0	0	2	0	2	4	1	11	37	0	0	
Hate Speech	40	6	1	0	0	1410	0	0	14	1	53	4	0	1	0	8	1	0	0	0	5	9	1	12	2	0	0	
Homicide Murder	2	7	0	0	0	67	0	0	11	1	23	0	0	1	2	3	0	0	0	0	4	1	0	0	22	0	0	



Orders from government authorities in the European Union to provide information																												
Category of illegal content by Member State																												
Categories of illegal content	AT	BE	BG	CY	CZ	DE	DK	EE	ES	FI	FR	GR	HR	HU	IE	IT	LT	LU	LV	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SE	SI	SK	
Human Exploitation Trafficking	8	2	2	0	0	39	0	0	3	0	10	0	1	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	
Intellectual Property	0	3	0	0	0	49	0	0	5	0	5	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	7	0	2	0	0	0	
Kidnapping	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	
Missing Adult	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	4	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	
Missing Minor	0	0	0	0	0	21	0	0	1	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	
National Security Terrorism	53	78	3	0	0	903	0	0	220	3	1518	1	0	1	6	75	0	1	0	6	110	0	0	1	2	0	0	
Organized Crime	2	1	1	1	0	44	0	0	3	0	15	2	1	0	0	9	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	9	0	0	
Physical Assault	3	5	0	0	0	114	0	0	8	3	14	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	2	0	0	
Road Traffic Offenses	0	0	0	0	0	48	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	
Robbery Theft	6	6	0	0	0	120	0	0	10	3	31	0	0	1	11	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	0	6	4	0	0	
Sex Crimes	2	4	0	0	0	218	1	0	26	1	65	3	2	0	6	15	0	0	0	1	0	2	0	1	9	0	0	
Sextortion	21	20	1	0	0	82	1	0	47	4	57	2	0	1	2	12	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	
Suicide Self Harm	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	1	0	0	
Threat To Kill	14	10	6	0	0	167	11	0	41	7	61	1	1	1	6	33	0	0	0	3	14	5	1	8	37	0	0	



Annex G - Complaints and disputes

TikTok provides notifications to users who have violated our Policies or applicable local laws. Users who report content that they believe violates our Policies or applicable local laws are also notified of the outcome of TikTok's decision. In both cases, users can appeal the decision once they receive the notification. This Annex G comprises the number of appeals received from users who have appealed the outcome of content they have reported, as well as users or advertisers who have appealed a decision to remove their content.

Total number of appeals received: Between 1 January and 30 2025, we received 3,075,758 appeals from users and advertisers who uploaded content to the platform and who appealed the moderation action to: remove their video or ad content, or restrict their access to LIVE under our Policies; or geoblock their content under applicable local laws. In the same time period, we also received 1,054,432 appeals from users who reported content which they believed violated our Policies or applicable local laws.

Basis for those complaints: When appealing a decision, in many cases, users and advertisers are given the opportunity to include a written explanation to set out the basis of their appeal. Where users and advertisers are given the opportunity to explain their basis of appeal by free text, the bases of appeals necessarily vary between each user or advertiser submitting an appeal.

Decisions taken in respect of the complaints: Between 1 January and 30 June 2025, we reinstated or removed restrictions from 1,359,823 pieces of user-generated video or ad content, or access to LIVE. In the same period, we removed 61,095 user-generated videos or ad content, or access to LIVE, following an appeal from a user who reported content which they believed violated our Policies or applicable local laws. Note that these numbers cannot be compared directly to the number of moderation actions taken or the number of actions appealed in that period. This is because some moderation decisions may have been appealed within the previous time period, and the outcome of some moderation decisions may not be actioned until the next time period.

Median time needed for taking the decisions: The median time for TikTok to decide on an appeal submitted by a user or advertiser on moderation action taken on their content, across all relevant features, is under 2 hours. The median time for TikTok to decide on an appeal submitted by a user on the outcome of content they reported is under 2 hours.

Out of court disputes

In H1 2025, we received 1,121 complaints under Article 21 of the DSA from Dispute Settlement Bodies about our content moderation decisions, of which, during the same time period, 498 cases were closed. Of these, the Dispute Settlement Body has: (i) disagreed with TikTok's content moderation decision in 106 cases (29 of which we implemented the decision); (ii) agreed with TikTok's content moderation decision in 113 cases; and (iii) resolved the complaint without issuing a formal decision in 189 cases.

The median time for handling these Article 21 appeals was around 26 days, which includes the time taken for each of the procedural steps of the dispute settlement process (e.g., whether the parties are asked to submit written or oral statements; or whether the approved dispute settlement body requires a hearing etc.).



Annex H - Monthly active recipients

This Annex H sets out the average number of 'monthly active recipients' in the European Union broken down per each Member State during the period 1 January to 30 June 2025, rounded to the nearest hundred thousand.

We have produced this calculation for the purposes of complying with our obligations under the Article 42(3) of the DSA and it should not be relied on for other purposes. We have applied the same methodology used when calculating our total monthly active recipients number for the European Union published in August 2025. In light of our legal requirements to provide the number broken down per Member State and given that users may have accessed the platform from different Member States in the relevant period, the estimates below may mean, in certain limited circumstances, user access is counted more than once.

Where we have shared user metrics in other contexts, the methodology and scope may have differed. Our approach to producing this calculation may evolve or may require altering over time, for example, because of product changes or new technologies.



Market code	Market name	Monthly active recipients
AT	Austria	2.5M
BE	Belgium	4.2M
BG	Bulgaria	2.6M
CY	Cyprus	0.6M
CZ	Czech Republic	2.4M
DE	Germany	25.7M
DK	Denmark	1.5M
EE	Estonia	0.4M
ES	Spain	23.4M
FI	Finland	1.8M
FR	France	27.8M
GR	Greece	4.5M
HR	Croatia	1.3M
HU	Hungary	3.4M
IE	Ireland	2.4M
IT	Italy	23.9M
LT	Lithuania	1.0M
LU	Luxembourg	0.3M
LV	Latvia	0.9M
MT	Malta	0.3M
NL	Netherlands	6.7M
PL	Poland	13.4M
PT	Portugal	4.2M
RO	Romania	9.1M
SE	Sweden	3.6M
SI	Slovenia	0.6M
SK	Slovakia	1.2M